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ESSAY
RESPONSE
Eduardo M. Peiialver*
I am grateful to Cornell Law School for organizing this panel discussion and to the Cornell Journalof Law and Public Policy for publishing the proceedings and for giving me an opportunity to respond to the
excellent comments of the panelists. I am particularly grateful to my
colleague Laura Underkuffler for her generous praise of the book, and I
find little to disagree with in her comments. She is right to distinguish
between the utilitarian case for redistribution and justifications built
around objective conceptions of human need.
Although we tried in the book to emphasize the distinction between
the two frameworks, we hoped to avoid having to engage with the deeper
theoretical conflicts that arise between them. Instead, our goal was to
explore the possibility of an overlapping consensus with regard to how
these competing accounts respond to the phenomena of property outlaws.
I agree with Professor Underkuffler that the "politics of need" describes
the moral universe very differently than the utilitarian or economic language of preferences and desires. But I do think the situations the former
identifies for ratifying forced exchanges will usually coincide with those
identified by the latter. Nevertheless, Professor Underkuffler's comments convince me that we should have discussed in more depth the
potential for conflict between the two accounts and explored more fully
the situations in which they diverge.
Professor Lastowka's thoughtful remarks also provide an opportunity to offer a few clarifications of our thesis. In his comments, he
makes four important points: (1) that, contrary to our motivation in writing the book, the image of "outlaws" does not really need to be rehabilitated, since they are embraced within popular culture, as figures like
Robin Hood and Jean Valjean make clear, (2) that we have conveniently
picked our examples to portray outlaws in an unambiguously favorable
light, (3) that we should not favor self-help redistribution because of its
potentially harmful consequences, and (4) that, in a democracy, disobedience must be a marginal technique of political expression with very limited significance. Although I find much to agree with in Professor
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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Lastowka's insightful remarks, I would like to offer a few counterpoints
as well.
Responding to our assertion that outlaws are not generally held in
high regard, Lastowka explains, "I would argue that 'the image of the
intentional property outlaw' is really not so tarnished. Indeed, my sense
is that we have a certain level of attraction to outlaws of all sorts-at
least when they keep their distance from our daily lives."' His qualification about the attraction to outlaws-even in popular culture-helps to
illustrate the ambivalent role outlaws play in our legal culture. We
sometimes exhibit a soft spot for outlaws, but primarily when they "keep
their distance." And yet, as Lastowka points out, "[i]f a property outlaw
is simply someone who fails to follow the letter of property law, the
majority of people are property outlaws."
It is this tension-our simultaneous fascination and discomfort with
property disobedience, even while we go about violating property lawsto which we refer in discussing the importance of exploring the phenomenon in greater depth. In addition, while our popular culture does provide examples of likeable outlaws, when it comes to actually discussing
whether outlaws have a role to play in a functioning property system,
most legal scholars make no room for them. Thus, the dominant economic analyses of theft find no possibility of productive elementswhether redistributive or informational-within forced exchanges. Our
goal is to move beyond simple romanticism about Robin Hood or the
Rebel Alliance and to explore whether our culture's occasionally positive
attitudes towards property disobedience is grounded in any good that
they actually accomplish and, if so, whether that good is (or can somehow be) reflected in legal structures.
Lastowka worries that we have cherry picked our examples to highlight the positive examples of disobedience, to the neglect of the mostly
negative consequences of disobedience. He asks:
Pefialver and Katyal stack the deck by offering us the
outlaw protester, the homeless squatter, Jean Vaijean
stealing bread for the children, and the politicized
hacker. The majority of non-violent property outlaws
are probably the shoplifters of the world. Are they also
in need of image rehabilitation? Do they provide the
same sorts of social benefits that the book's noble outlaws provide? 2

1 Greg Lastowka, Property Outlaws, Rebel Mythologies, and Social Bandits, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 377 (2010).
2 Lastowka, supra note 1, at 384.
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The default position in most legal scholarship is that property disobedience is unjustified and unproductive. At the same time-as Lastowka acknowledges when he says that virtually everyone violates
property laws-this overridingly negative attitude towards property disobedience, particularly in legal scholarship, is clearly not the entire story.
Thus, although we acknowledge at the outset that most forms of
disobedience are unproductive, 3 we self-consciously chose to provoke
readers' attention by presenting examples of disobedience that successfully generated legal reforms. We do not suggest that these examples are
representative of the universe of property disobedience. Indeed, we go
out of our way to note that they are not. As we note in the introduction,
the category of "outlaws" includes both the civil rights sit-in participants
and those who, since 1964, have continued to deny equal access to places
of public accommodation. 4 But, we do want to highlight the possibility
that some disobedience is productive and that such a phenomenon can
help to explain existing features of the law that have proven puzzling to
legal scholars (e.g., certain features of the law of adverse possession or
necessity). At the same time, we hope to complicate the implications of
acknowledging that, as Lastowka puts it, "[t]he majority of non-violent
property outlaws are probably the shoplifters of the world." 5 In that regard, our examples are not wholly unrepresentative. Although the 19thcentury squatters on the American frontier now enjoy the respectable status of "pioneers," they were - at the time - described as little better (and
often much worse) than shoplifters. The same can be said of today's filesharers.
The challenge is to acknowledge that the enforcement of property
laws is vitally important to owners and to society as a whole, while at the
same time recognizing the complexity of the phenomenon of property
disobedience. Correspondingly, the category of disobedience sweeps in
those who conscientiously dissent from the legal status quo; those who
callously disregard the rights of others; those who unintentionally transgress confusing property norms; those who are desperately on the edge
of survival; and many others (including some who would fit under more
than one of these descriptions). The question is whether a system of
property that seeks-as ours surely does-to discourage or punish the
"shoplifters of the world" can find ways to do so without losing sight of
these other, more ambiguous, consequences of lawbreaking. As we put it
in the book:
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4 See id. at vii-viii.

5 Lastowka, supra note 1, at 384.
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It goes without saying, then, that acknowledging the
complexity of property disobedience does not mean canonizing any of the groups we describe. Thus, as we say

in the Introduction, there is no guarantee that disobedience will be directed towards progressive ends: Nineteenth-century squatters, for example, frequently
dispossessed Native Americans of their land even as
they clamored for recognition of their own informal
property rights. Similarly, racist property owners continue to break the law and exclude people from public
accommodations on the basis of race, just as the civil
rights protesters dissented from the status quo by forcing
themselves onto segregationist property in violation of
trespass laws. 6
Our position is not in favor of outlaws generally, or even squatters
in particular. It is in favor of recognizing the complexity of the category
of property disobedience. Thus, while (as a policy matter) we generally
approve of the Homestead Act, that does not require us to disregard settlers' own injustice towards Native Americans. Our main purpose in telling the story, however, was to highlight the role that squatting had in
shaping federal land law over the course of the nineteenth century and
trying to determine whether there are any broader lessons to be gleaned
from that role.
The ambiguity of the nineteenth-century squatters leads nicely into
Lastowka's third criticism: that we are not adequately sensitive to the
dangers of self-help redistribution as a means to economic justice. A
poor person can inflict significant injustice as he goes about trying to
satisfy his own needs. We agree with Lastowka's wise concern about
this danger. For just this reason, we warn that "associated with any government decision to permit violations of general laws against forced
transfers [of property] is the risk of creating negative spillover effects
that could easily outweigh any short-term gains achieved by a specific
forced redistribution." 7 And these risks are often concentrated on other
people on the margins of the property system, who are less able than the
well-to-do to fend for themselves.
But, even taking into account these risks, situations will arise in
which the injustice of the existing distribution is so great and the prospects of adequate state response are so dim that the costs are worth paying. This is not, and we do not argue that it is, a strategy that a state
ought to pursue as an explicit goal. We therefore agree with Lastowka
6 PEf4ALVER & KATYAL, supra note 3, at vii.
7 Id. at 131.
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that "any state that relies on modern-day Robin Hoods as a significant
source of redistributive value has clearly failed to meaningfully protect
the interests of its citizens." 8 In fact, that is precisely our point in
presenting, as we suggest self-help as an alternative to state-coordinated
redistribution.
But our book is not an exercise in ideal theory. Rather, it is an
attempt to grapple with property systems as they actually exist-in a
world with imperfect legislatures and occasionally heartless (or clueless)
democratic majorities. In this world, government inevitably fails from
time to time, sometimes because of indifference and sometimes because
of a lack of information. And when it does so, disobedience (even disobedience that is not conscientious) can work as a second-best mechanism
for satisfying people's needs. More importantly, such disobedience can
bring government's failure to the attention of the public and political
elites, encouraging it to pursue more efficient means of accomplishing
the same goal.
This observation of occasional state failure also sheds light on Lastowka's fourth point. In an ideal state, he says, "we would not seek to
encourage most individuals to follow their inner outlaw in lieu of other
forms of political participation." 9 He continues by noting that "peaceful
civil disobedience tends to be largely symptomatic of a failure in other
forums."1 0 Lastowka says that, "[in a country where more than a quarter of the public declines to vote, I do not think we are at great risk that
many people will choose to adopt outlaw tactics."II
But, it is important to recognize that low levels of voter engagement
can signal either apathy or disgust. The former can result when government is actually working for most people, while the latter constitutes a
more troubling symptom of disengagement in the face of a persistently
nonresponsive state. Disobedience has a role to play in both contexts. In
a functional democracy, Dan Markovits has observed that, even under
the best of circumstances, decision-making is characterized by inertia
that prevents majorities from recognizing the need for-or summoning
the energy to accomplish-legal change.12 Disobedience therefore plays
a crucial role in spurring the kind of democratic engagement necessary
for the recognition of latent majorities.
In addition, as Robert Cover recognized, where mechanisms of governance have broken down and no longer respond to majority sentiment-or where (by accident or design) they persistently disfavor
8 Lastowka, supra note 1, at 388.
9 Id. at 389.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12

See Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114
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marginalized minorities-disobedience can constitute a form of resistance that may even succeed in changing existing structures for the better.13 This is arguably the kind of disobedience undertaken by the
participants in the Greensboro sit-ins.
To sum up, we did not write the book because we think all (or even
most) disobedience is valuable or productive. And we think the existing
law, particularly in the realm of tangible property, often does a reasonably good job of responding to disobedience. In the book, we recount a
number of ways that the law of property already accommodates a great
deal of productive disobedience through private under-enforcement and
doctrines like necessity and adverse possession. We do think, however,
that legal scholars have generally failed to recognize the complex role of
disobedience within our property system. Our goal is to shed some light
on that complexity and on what it can teach us about how property
works, and we are grateful to Professor Lastowka for pushing us to further refine some of those themes.

13 See Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword:Nomos and Narratives,
97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).

